Every proxy provider routes your traffic through someone else's IP address. The question that matters is whose, and how they got it. Our answer is simple and checkable: we physically own and operate the modems our carrier IPs run on, and everything beyond that comes from an opt-in, paid peer network. We can show you where every IP comes from.
Two supply sources, both auditable. Owned hardware on real mobile carriers, plus peers who explicitly opted in and get paid for the bandwidth they share. Nothing bought from brokers of unknown origin, nothing bundled silently into someone's free app.
The core of our network is 133 physical modems on real mobile carriers, spread across 6 countries. We bought the hardware, we installed the SIM cards, we run the racks. When your request exits through one of these IPs, it exits through a device we control end to end - your traffic enters at gw.proxies.sx and leaves on a carrier connection we can point to on a shelf.
That means there is no mystery middle layer: no aggregator we license IPs from, no upstream reseller whose sourcing practices we have to take on faith. If you want to see how requests are routed across the fleet, thepool gatewaypage explains the mechanics.
Our second supply source is a peer network with two non-negotiable properties: every peer opts in explicitly, and every peer gets paid for the bandwidth they contribute. That is the entire model. There is no free-VPN bait, no SDK quietly embedded in a flashlight app, no consent buried on page 40 of a EULA.
Consent plus compensation is what makes peer supply auditable rather than merely plausible. If you want to see the peer side from the inside - or join it - the peers page documents how registration, routing and per-GB payouts work.
Much of the residential proxy market works differently. Large pools aggregate IPs they do not control - bought from third-party suppliers, harvested through bundled SDKs, or resold through chains of brokers. Some of those IPs were obtained cleanly; some were abused or enrolled without meaningful consent. The operator often cannot tell you which is which, and neither can you. That is not a performance problem - it is a provenance problem, and it lands on the customer whose traffic was routed through it.
| Aggregated pool of unknown provenance | PROXIES.SX supply | |
|---|---|---|
| Who controls the exit device | Unknown - often a broker chain | Us (owned modems) or a consenting peer |
| How the IP was obtained | Bought / bundled / resold - varies per IP | Hardware we purchased, or explicit paid opt-in |
| Can the provider show origin per IP | Usually not | Yes - ask us |
| Whose consent backs the supply | Often unverifiable | Ours (we own it) or the peer's (paid, explicit) |
| Who inherits the risk when sourcing goes wrong | The customer | A question we can answer with evidence |
In July 2026, the FBI seized the domains of a major residential proxy provider after its supply was tied to a ~2-million-device botnet, as reported by Krebs on Security and The Register. We take no pleasure in that - it was a bad week for a lot of teams who did nothing wrong except trust a supplier.
The lasting lesson is not about one company. It is that every customer of an opaque pool inherited a provenance question overnight: where was my traffic actually routed, and would I be able to prove it was clean? Verifiable sourcing is the only answer that survives that question - and it is an argument only a provider that owns its hardware and pays its peers can actually make.
Our honest limit: we are 6 countries, not a 195-country network. If you need that breadth of coverage, a giant like Bright Data or Oxylabs is the closer fit and we will say so. What we offer is clean-sourced, auditable supply in the countries we cover - and if a supplier outage broke your pipeline, our Data Works team can rebuild and run it for you while you regroup.
The same clean-sourced IPs are available self-serve from $4/GB, down to $2.40/GB at volume. Endpoints, rotation and support are free - you pay only for the GB you use, and GB never expire. If you would rather have the pipeline built and run for you, scope a Data Works project instead.
Pricing verified July 2026.
We physically own and operate the modems our carrier IPs run on - 133 physical modems on real mobile carriers across 6 countries. A typical residential pool aggregates IPs it does not control, often bought from third-party suppliers or SDK bundles, so the operator cannot fully verify how each IP was obtained. Ownership is what makes our supply auditable end to end.
Beyond our owned modems, we run a peer network where every participant explicitly opts in and is paid for the bandwidth they share. Nobody is enrolled silently through a bundled SDK or a free app they did not read the terms of. Consent plus compensation is the standard we hold that supply to.
Yes. Because we control both supply sources, we can show you the origin of every IP we route your traffic through: which owned modem and carrier it exited on, or that it came from a consenting, paid peer. Ask on the scoping call and we will walk you through it for your specific setup.
In July 2026, the FBI seized the domains of a major residential proxy provider after its supply was tied to a ~2-million-device botnet, as reported by Krebs on Security and The Register. Every customer of a pool with opaque sourcing inherits that kind of provenance and compliance question. Verifiable sourcing is the only durable answer, and it is an argument only a provider that controls its supply can make.
Owned modems on real carriers in 6 countries, plus paid, consenting peers. If provenance matters to your compliance team, bring them to the call.